Abstract
Introduction
The paper intends to give a mid-term assessment of the achievements of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Pre-accession assistance, in the form of EU funds for candidate countries, is part and parcel of a process aimed at fostering institutional and policy change, with the fi nal aim of accelerating EU membership. The IPA Regulation replaces all previous instruments for both offi cial candidate and potential candidate countries, while differentiating them on their access to assistance components and funds management decentralisation. The IPA aims at improving the governance structures and at strengthening administrative capacities, in order to prepare the candidate countries to the administrative tasks implied in being an EU member state. I operationalise its performance through three indicators: the levels of funds allocation, funds absorption, and administrative reform.
Firstly, I compare the levels of fi nancial assistance per country both in absolute terms, and in relative (per capita) terms. Secondly, drawing from the Financial Transparency System of the European Commission, I present the amount of funds awarded to the benefi ciary countries according to:
(a) the country of the benefi ciary, (b) the location of the action, and (c) a combination of the two, pointing to the absorption capacity of local agencies. Thirdly, I check the development of administrative capacities in target countries through the progress in establishing a Decentralised Implementation System (DIS). Such a reform is instrumental in allowing national governments to achieve accreditation by the European Commission for decentralised management and to gain access to all available budget lines under the IPA. Through the analysis of the IPA Progress Reports for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 it is possible to identify the main trends. The DIS accreditation process proceeds separately for each country and IPA component through six stages, resulting in a highly differentiated pattern.
Preliminary fi ndings show that the allocation levels are path-dependent; absorption levels wary widely, and may be linked with local administrative capacities. Finally, at mid-term, the IPA has pushed some countries to develop decentralised management of EU funds. Progress has nevertheless proven particularly diffi cult in the most laggard territories (Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo) , highlighting that in such cases the IPA lacks force to push for deep internal reforms. The challenge for the next budgetary period for the IPA will be to identify and address the factors hindering funds absorption and decentralised management in the laggard territories too. Likely, additional incentives will be needed for this scope.
The fi nancial instrument of EU pre-accession assistance
Pre-accession assistance, in the form of EU funds for candidate countries, is part and parcel of a process aimed at fostering institutional and policy change, with the fi nal aim of accelerating EU membership. The current framework for relations between the EU and its candidate countries in the Western Balkans (WB) 1 is the Stabilisation and Association Process an overall structure to pre-accession fi nancial assistance for both offi cial candidate 3 and potential candidate countries, 4 while introducing a differentiation in the assistance components between the two categories.
While candidate countries have access to all IPA budget lines, including the ones mimicking the most closely the EU structural funds (regional development, agriculture, human resources), potential candidate countries may only accede to the fi rst two, aimed at institution-building and regional 1 "Western Balkans" is a referent including those South East European countries which are candidate or potential candidate to EU accession in the 2007/2014 timeframe. It refers to all former Yugoslav countries, minus Slovenia, plus Albania. Besides the Western Balkans, the IPA financial instrument applies also to Turkey and Iceland; they are altogether indicated in European Commission documents as "target" or "beneficiary" countries.
cooperation. Moreover, while decentralised management is a stricter requirement for candidate countries, potential candidates may continue spending EU funds through centralised EU Commission management.
The structure of the IPA funds is "designed to mirror the Structural Funds" of the EU 5 and they have to be managed accordingly. Their aim is to provide candidate countries with a training mechanism to set up administrative capacities and learn how to deal appropriately with cohesion and structural funds after EU accession. The focus of the IPA is therefore on institution building and on compliance with the acquis, in a full accessiondriven perspective. The management system is more structured, although still fl exible; it provides for a roadmap towards the establishment of the Decentralised Implementation System in each administration, fi nal objective for all target countries. present in the previous pre-accession funds, to introduce the three principles, already contextually present only in the EU structural funds. In doing so, the IPA "deliberately mimic cohesion policy requirements to prepare candidate countries more effectively for managing cohesion policy post-accession".
8 Bache (op. cit., p. 3) Since Europeanisation is understood as a two-way process, in order to defi ne the explanatory variables it is important to consider not only the EU level, but also the domestic level. 12 To analyse the IPA, both levels are important, in order to take into account both the structure of the instrument and the recipient countries' specifi c features. The main key conditions underlined in the relevant literature are summarized in Table 4 . 1990-2000 1996-2000 1990-2000 2000-2006 2007-2013 Target countries BiH 
Candidate status differentiation and performance of pre-accession funds
The issue of differentiation has been called into attention by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in a 2005 a priori analysis of the draft IPA regulation.
14 According to the ESI, the IPA was an "essentially passive" strategy towards the region, aiming only at providing, at best, the same amounts and the same quality of the previous CARDS funds, whose experience and impact were deemed "disappointing" and "very limited". A differentiation in the IPA approach might therefore have carried heavy risks, fi rst of all the one of a 'double bluff' in which, in the absence of relevant incentives, the EU would pretend to offer membership while candidate countries would pretend to reform, resulting in a delaying tactic postponing fi nal accession perspectives beyond 2020 and eroding the EU's infl uence in the region. The correction put forward by the ESI included the need to link assistance to the signature of SAAs rather than to candidate status, following the example of the strategy towards Bulgaria, that had achieved a "dramatic policy and institutional change" by opening up all pre-accession instruments to the country even in absence of an offi cial candidacy.
The call of the ESI was taken up again in 2008 by Tamás Szemlér in his analysis of the appropriateness of the IPA to the political situation and to the development needs of the Western Balkans. 15 Szemlér remarked in particular the lack, in the context of the Western Balkans, of the three merits of the 'regatta approach' for Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, namely incentives for reform, adequate assistance, and credible commitment. He therefore suggested opening up the regatta between all offi cial and potential candidate countries, in order to give incentives for reforms and enhance the credibility of accession perspectives.
The present paper intends to answer the question if the differentiation among target countries, based on candidacy status, had a relevant impact on the performance of the EU pre-accession funds in the Western Balkans.
As such, it aims to verify or confute the claim of the ESI and of Szemlér.
In fact, the current structure of the IPA tries to square the circle of the dilemma of fairness: how to treat equally countries that are at substantially different pre-accession stages? With this aim, it provides an overall regional approach, while preserving differentiation in the access to its components and in their management strategies. To ensure that differentiation does not end up into ghettoisation, it provides for two important correctives: fi rst, the amount of funds available (while higher in absolute terms) remains roughly the same for all WB territories once taken into consideration population and development needs; second, the reform process towards decentralised management is set to start for both categories of candidates, though incentives may be stronger for offi cial candidate countries.
The research takes a causal research design, with a comparative approach to the mid-term outcomes of IPA. It compares the various target countries in the Western Balkans and evaluate whether the various levels of performance of IPA (variance in funds allocation, funds absorption, or administrative reform) are correlated with the candidacy status of the target countries.
The aim of the IPA funds is to improve the governance structures and to strengthen administrative capacities. Several criteria may be taken in consideration in order to draw a preliminary assessment of their effi ciency.
I operationalise their performance through three indicators: the levels of (a) funds allocation, (b) funds absorption, and (c) administrative reform.
(a) the country of the benefi ciary, (b) the location of the action, and (c) a combination of the two, pointing to the absorption capacity of local agencies. Thirdly, I check the development of administrative capacities in target countries through the progress in establishing a Decentralised Implementation System (DIS). Such a reform is instrumental in allowing national governments to achieve accreditation for decentralised management and to gain access to all available budget lines under the IPA. Through the analysis of the IPA Progress Reports for 2008, 2009, and 2010, it is possible to identify the main trends in the progress of DIS establishment. to suggest that candidate status may play a role in the defi nition of per capita funds allocations. Anyway, the presence in the same upper grouping of Kosovo, which is far away from candidate status, should make us wary of intervenient variables (e.g. fi xed costs of new national administrations, expensive consociational agreements, and post-confl ict rebuilding efforts). Candidacy status may at best be a suffi cient condition for a higher than average level of per capita pre-accession assistance, but not a necessary one.
Funds allocations, per country

Funds absorption, per country
In the framework of the EU budget and fi nances, the funds absorption capacity has been defi ned as "the extent to which a state (member or non-member) is able to spend the allocated fi nancial resources fully and in an effective and effi cient way".
19 Funds absorption represent an issue to be tackled, as the achievement of cohesion targets largely depends on timely and effective spending of the available amounts of funds.
Underspending is highly deprecated, as it results in the need to send the money back to Brussels, and it might infl uence future funding levels. When the two criteria exposed above are applied together, as in an intersection, the data extracted show a lower absolute value (496 mln €, slightly less than 30% of the total). This amount refl ects the value of the agreements contracted with local implementing parties for actions on the territory of the Western Balkans. In this case, the highest per capita values are expressed by Kosovo and Serbia, while values close to zero appear for Croatia. 23 No relation with the candidate status of pre-accession countries may be noticed from the data even here. 23 The shadow of the European Reconstruction Agency (EAR) is also not apparent from the data: the territories where previous EU funds were managed by the EAR have no additional burden in absorbing funds through the new implementing methods. This is shown by the parallel paths of Albania and Montenegro, running contrary to the expectations according to the candidacy hypothesis.
Maps 3 -IPA awarded funds, per country/territory (benefi ciary's address), in € per capita per year (2007/12) Figure 1 -as above Maps 4 -IPA awarded funds, per geographical zone (location of the action) in € per capita per year (2009/12) Figure 2 -as above Maps 5 -IPA awarded funds, per location of the action and benefi ciary's address in € per capita per year (2009/12)
At mid-term, the IPA has pushed some candidate countries to develop administrative structures able to sustain a Decentralised Implementation System, a necessary step towards the use of IPA funds, from the perspective of future implementation of EU regional and cohesion funds. On the other hand, such developments have had variable records from country to country. The process of management decentralisation is likely to be brought around conclusions by 2014 in most of the countries of the region, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Progress in management decentralisation proved particularly diffi cult in these territories, which are also lagging behind in the EU integration process.
In such cases, the IPA lacks enough force to constitute an incentive for deep internal reform.
The challenge for the new post-2014 IPA-II will be to foster decentralised management in the laggard territories too, in order to foster capacitybuilding of national administration. Likely, additional incentives will be needed for this scope. in Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia is also the territory in which the highest share of funds goes to national implementing agencies rather than to foreign consultancies. Concerning absorption levels, the candidate status of a country does not appear to be either a suffi cient or a necessary condition.
Finally, the progress in management decentralisation up to 2010 highlights the differentiated pattern of pre-accession development in the Western
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